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Purpose – This research seeks to determine the success of turnaround strategies adopted by 
corporations in Thailand following post-bankruptcy reorganization plans approved by the Thai 
Central Bankruptcy Court.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – The study uses a sample of 101 companies whose 
reorganization plans have been confirmed by the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court in the period 
1999 – 2002, with performance measures to 2005.  
 
Findings – The results indicate that over a three year reorganization period successful companies 
were found to be most likely to adopt cost and expense reduction, company size reduction and 
disposal of non-core assets while operational strategies aimed at reconfiguring internal operations 
and systems were not likely to be associated with successful companies.  
 
Practical implications – The data suggests, subject to limitations, the selection of restructuring 
methods may differ between those companies which successfully reform and those which do not. 
Companies pursuing successful turnaround strategies where found most likely to adopt cost and 
expense reduction, company size reduction and disposal of non-core assets as significant 
operational strategy.  
 
Originality/value – Prior research in Thailand has not investigated turnaround strategy of 
successful and unsuccessful companies. The result of the study has practical significance as it 
provides information of use to regulators, management, lenders, creditors, practitioners, and 
investors. The prevailing economic conditions worldwide suggest the need for replication and 
continual refinement of research in this area not only in Thailand but elsewhere.        
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The present study examines the success or otherwise of turnaround strategies adopted by 
corporations in Thailand following post-bankruptcy reorganization plans approved by the Thai 
Central Bankruptcy Court during the period 1999-2002 with performance results to 2005. The 
motivation to identify the overall success of the restructure process and the restructure strategies 
commonly pursued is provided by Chitnomrath et al (2011, p.62) when they state “… research 
into the efficacy of the various restructuring methods undertaking by firms [in their study] would 
also provide interesting guidelines for planners, administrators and practitioners”. 
 
This study is significant for a number of reasons. First, the significant increase in number of 
bankruptcies associated with the global financial crisis has highlighted the value of a topic 
investigating turnaround strategies. Second, it may provide specific knowledge to regulators 
which may be incorporated into Thai legislation as a condition of reorganization approval. Third, 
planners, directors and managers may be made aware of unsuccessful strategies and so be in a 
position to possibly avoid them. Fourth, this information would be useful to lenders and creditors 
for credit assessment and investors for formulating investment strategy. Finally, practitioners 
may gain knowledge to counsel clients on strategy for possible successful turnaround.  
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. The second section indicates literature of 
some relevance to successful turnaround strategy undertaken other than in Thailand as well as 
research undertaken in Thailand. The third section includes sample criteria and proposed 
analysis. The fourth section provides information on future actual and proposed performance. 
The fifth section provides details of restructuring methods and their association with success or 
failure. The sixth section discusses the results obtained. The final section presents the conclusion, 





Research into Critical factors influencing successful bankruptcy reorganization other than in 
Thailand include those by Frank & Torous, 1989; Gertner & Scharfstein, 1991; Hambrick and 
Scheter, 1983;Chatterjee, Dhillon & Ramirez, 2004; Chen, 2003; Fisher & Martel, 2003; Michel, 
Shaked & McHugh, 1998; Platt & Platt, 2002; Datta & Iskandar-Datta, 1995; Dawley, 1999;   
Routledge & Gadenne, 2000; White, 1994; Chen, Weston & Altman, 1995; Fayez and Meyer, 
2001; Dhillon, Noe & Ramirez, 1995; O’Neill, 1986; John, John & Vasudevan, 2000; Triantis, 
1993; Denis and Rodgers, 2007; Dawley, Hoffman & Lamont, 2002; Denis & Rodgers, 2007; 
Berkovitch and Israel, 1991. These studies included the recontracting process, debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing, management changes, a firm’s profitability, financial and operational 
projections in the reorganization plan, cost reduction, refocusing and restructuring strategy, and 
the efficiency of insolvent firms.  
 
While these studies on corporate restructuring have contributed to the literature they are not 
entirely comparable with Thailand. Apart from the source of the data, Thailand has different 
selection criteria for companies to enter a restructuring plan. Namely, a stipulated amount owing 
to creditors and the company reorganization plans accepted by the bankruptcy court together with 




To date, only three research studies of formal methods of corporate workout have been conducted 
in Thailand. The first by Vongvipanond, Jumpa and Wichitaksorn (2002) was based on empirical 
evidence of court - supervised corporate restructuring in Thailand focused on economic and legal 
perspectives. The second study was undertaken by Pipatsitee, Kuldilouk and Ekukara (2003), at 
the Center for Applied Economics Research, Faculty of Economics, Kasetsart University, 
Thailand. They extended the first piece of research concerning the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the Thai bankruptcy court in terms of managing and controlling debt restructuring proceedings 
comparing it with the Corporate Restructuring Group, Bank of Thailand and the Thai Asset 
Management Corporation. The third study by Pipatsitee, Kuldilouk, Ekukara and Kuntong (2004) 
extended previous research by examining ways for law development and the development of the 
law enforcement to improve debt restructuring efficiency. It was found that only the first, the 
research of Vongvipanond et al. (2002) investigated the implementation of the reorganization 
plan and a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance, finding a 49% recovery rate during the period 
1998-2002. 
 
While these studies on corporate restructuring in Thailand have contributed to the literature in 
that country there is a research gap evident. Specifically, these studies did not consider the 
corporate turnaround strategies employed and their associated performance.  In the broader 
literature, turnaround strategies have been primarily studied using a limited number of high level 
constructs (such as market share, industry type, management changes, etc.). This study is unique 
in including a comprehensive range of methods as proposed by the administrators actually 
charged with implementing the strategy.  
 
Sample used for analysis 
 
The sample includes all companies which filed petitions for Chapter 3/1 bankruptcy under the 
Thai Bankruptcy Act and whose plans have been confirmed by the bankruptcy court between 
January 1999 and December 2002. The primary investigation found that 111 private sector 
companies had met the selection criteria of owing creditor(s) at least 10 million Baht and having 
their reorganization plans accepted by the bankruptcy court (Table 1). Table 1 indicates the 
number of bankruptcies, with the exception of 2002 which remained relatively constant with 
2001, was significantly increasing posing a major problem for the regulator and hence worthy of 
turnaround strategy research. A quantitative analysis employing logistic regression will be 
undertaken to determine the prevalence of methods adopted by both successful and unsuccessful 
companies. For the purposes of this analysis the sample size is further reduced to 101 companies 






















Note: The bankruptcy court opened on June 18, 1999. 
 
Performance measurement 
Figure 1 presents a firm’s post-bankruptcy performance measured in terms of the median first 
three-year actual profits before tax during the reorganization period as compared to that predicted 
in the reorganization plans of insolvent firms in Thailand. Median scores of actual profits before 
tax (APBT) in years 1, 2, 3 were -12.83, -5.33 and 0.00 million Baht, respectively, whereas 
median scores of predicted profits before tax (PPBT) were -6.88, 0.00 and 2.28 million Baht, 
respectively. Figure 1 presents graphs of median values of the first three-year actual and 
predicted profits before tax for the 101 sample firms. The median post-bankruptcy performance 
improved over the three year period and also moved closer to that predicted each year. This 
suggests Planners were overly optimistic on their ability to turnaround their respective 
companies, particularly in the early years of operation of the plan The results also indicate that in 
general the insolvent firms’ performance improved while reorganization plans were being 
implemented. Intuitively this is appealing because there would likely be a lag between 
implementation and the results of implementation.  
 
 
FIGURE 1: A COMPARISON OF THE THREE-YEAR MEDIAN ACTUAL AND 
PREDICTED PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
 
 
                       Notes:  APBT = Actual profits before tax in million Baht 
                                         PPBT = Predicted profits before tax in million Baht 
 
Year 
(that plans were 
accepted by the court) 
Total No. of firms 
each year 
1999 1 (0.9%) 
2000 16 (14.4%) 
2001 48 (43.2%) 
2002 46 (41.4%) 













APBT -12.83 -5.33 0 
PPBT -6.88 0 2.28 
1 2 3 
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Restructuring methods and performance 
All firms reported to the Central Bankruptcy Court details of operational, asset, and financial 
restructuring methods. For this study, ‘success’ is measured by a firm which achieves 
profitability by its third year of post restructure operation and ‘failure’ otherwise. Overall, 53% 
(54 companies) were successful and 47% (47companies) were unsuccessful. Table 2 presents the 
results of company performance and their relationship to the features of key restructuring 
mechanisms including operational, asset and financial restructurings. All companies used 
financial restructuring. For operational restructuring, a greater proportion of successful 
companies used operational restructuring than unsuccessful ones (69% versus 51%), and for asset 
restructuring, a higher proportion of successful companies used this form of restructuring than for 
unsuccessful ones (44% versus 38%).  
 
TABLE 2: A COMPARISON OF COMPANIES POST-BANKRUPTCY PERFORMANCE 
AND RESTRUCTURE METHOD 
                                                            Success                                     Failure 
                                                                                    (54 companies)                        (47 companies) 
Restructuring method 
 
1 Operational restructuring - Yes      37 (69%)            24  (51%) 
- No      17 (31%)            23  (49%) 
2 Asset restructuring -  Yes      24 (44%)            18 (38%) 
- No      30 (56%)            29 (62%) 
3 Financial restructuring - Yes       54 (100%)            47 (100%) 
- No        -                -   
 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the detailed methods of operational restructuring. Almost 50% of 
total firms attempted to reduce costs and expenses, while around 30% attempted to change 
management, production systems, and sales and service systems. Around 15 – 20% were 
involved in company size reduction, change in organization structure, improvement in financial 
and accounting systems, and change in internal control systems, including discontinuation of loss 
making operations. Less than 14% improved information systems, profitable activities, and 
compensation and wage systems.  
 
Panel B of Table 3 documents that the most common methods of asset restructuring were the 
disposal of non-core assets (86%), followed by the disposal of investments (21%). Some firms 
(12%) invested in capital assets. Four firms (9%) accepted mergers and acquisitions and only two 
(5%) were involved in intangible asset write-offs.  
 
Panel C of Table 3 discloses that 107 firms (96%) accepted debt write-off of principal and/or 
accrued interest. Approximately 60 -70 firms (over 50%) attempted to use debt to equity swaps 
(common share), deferment of principal and/or accrued interest, capital reduction from existing 
shareholders, and capital injection from new investors. 30 – 40% of firms reported debt 
repayment / reschedule / refinance, change in interest rate, and settlement of debts with non-
equity assets. Sixteen firms (14%) were granted a grace period and 8 firms (7%) used debt 
injection from new investors, while 7 firms (6%) injected capital from existing shareholders. A 
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small group chose to use debt to equity swaps into convertible debentures/bonds (4%) and debt to 
equity swaps into preference shares (2%).  
 
In summary, the results in Table 3 show that insolvent firms utilized multiple methods of 
operational, asset and financial reorganization through the court to relieve their debt burden and 
inject capital for continuing their businesses. Cost reduction, disposal of non-core assets and debt 
write-off were critical methods for restructuring. 
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TABLE 3: DETAILS OF RESTRUCTURING METHODS USED BY REORGANIZED FIRMS 
Panel A 
Methods of operational restructuring                           Total firms          
No. of firms using operational restructuring  67                                   
Methods: 
Cost and expense reduction 32 (48%)               
Change in management 21 (31%)               
Change in production system 19 (28%)               
Change in sale and service system 19 (28%)               
Company size reduction 13 (19%)                
Change in organization structure 13 (19%)             
Improvement in financial and accounting system 12 (18%)                
Change in internal control system 11 (16%)               
Discontinuation of loss making operation 10 (15%)               
Improvement in information system   9 (13%)               
Improvement in profitable activities   7 (11%)                
Improvement in compensation and wage system    3 (5%)                  
Panel B 
Methods of asset restructuring                                     Total firms           
No. of firms using asset restructuring  43                       
Methods: 
Disposal of non-core assets 37 (86%)           
Disposal of investments   9 (21%)              
Investment in capital assets   5 (12%)             
Mergers and acquisitions   4 (9%)              
Intangible asset write-off   2 (5%)              
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C 
Methods of financial restructuring                              Total firms            
No. of firms using financial restructuring  111                         
Methods: 
Debt write-off (principal and/or accrued interest)  107 (96%)             
Debt to equity swaps (common share)    69 (62%)           
Deferment of principal and/or accrued interest    63 (57%)            
Capital reduction from existing shareholders    62 (56%)          
Capital injection from new investors    61 (55%)         
Debt repayment / reschedule / refinance    43 (39%)           
Change in interest rate    40 (36%)           
Settlement of debts with non-equity assets    33 (30%)          
Granting of grace period    16 (14%)          
Debt injection from new investors      8 (7%)                
Capital injection from existing shareholders      7 (6%)            
Debt to equity swaps (convertible debenture/bond)      4 (4%)              




Note 1. For Table 3 the full sample of 111 firms is utilized as all firms disclosed information on restructuring 
methods. However, for the purpose of the following performance related analysis the sample is reduced to 101 due to 
missing performance data as discussed above Table 1. 
Note 2. Individual restructuring methods are as nominated by the bankruptcy administrator. These were subsequently 
grouped into the above three categories independently by each of the three authors. Minor differences arising were 
discussed and agreed in the final list above. 
Note 3. The number in brackets is the percentage of firms using the specific method divided by the total number of 
firms in each category  
 
Results and discussion 
 
The results for the logistic regression model are displayed in Table 4. In this model the impact of 
operational and asset restructuring items (as detailed in Table 3) on the success or otherwise of 
restructuring companies is examined. Financial restructuring is omitted from the analysis as all 
companies have undertaken some form of debt reduction or capital injection and it does not 
discriminate effectively between the two groups. Similarly, all items with greater than 90% of 
observations in one category are omitted. Tabachnik and Fidell (1996, p. 59) warn that the use of 
dichotomous variables, where more than 90% of the results fall in one category, may 
underestimate correlations existing in the true population. As a result, the variables 
‘discontinuation of loss making operation’, ‘improvement in information system’, ‘improvement 
in profitable activities’, ‘improvement in compensation and wage system’, ‘disposal of 
investments’, ‘investment in capital assets’, ‘mergers and acquisitions and intangible asset write-
off’, will be excluded from the logistic regression testing. 
 
The remaining 8 operational methods and 1 asset restructuring method are included as 
discriminating variables. Log company size (total assets) and industry (manufacturing and non-
manufacturing) are also included as control variables. Company size and industry type are 
selected as they are often used by researchers in this area, for example, Fayez and Meyer (2001) 
and Dahiya et al (2003).  
 
TABLE 4: PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL ON 
SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN RESTRUCTURING 
 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
 Cost and expense reduction 1.277 .597 4.568 .033* 3.584 
Change in management -.787 .849 .859 .354 .455 
Change in production system -.659 .830 .631 .427 .517 
Change in sale and service system -.858 .949 .818 .366 .424 
Company size reduction 2.120 .888 5.699 .017* 8.331 
Change in organization structure 1.272 .808 2.478 .115 3.569 
Improvement in accounting systems .571 .704 .657 .417 1.770 
Change in internal control systems -.953 .873 1.193 .275 .386 
Disposal of non-core assets 2.365 1.143 4.278 .039* 10.643 
Log company size .033 .178 .035 .852 1.034 
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Industry -.726 .562 1.669 .196 .484 
Constant -.511 1.181 .187 .665 .600 
* Significant at the 0.05 level.  
a. n=101 
b. Chi-square 29.511, sig=.002 
c. R square 0.253 (Cox and Snell); 0.338 (Nagelkerke) 
d. Hosmer and Lemeshow  7.606 , sig= 0.473 
 




 Predicted Percentage 
Correct  Failure Success 
  Failure 37 10 78.7 
Success 17 37 68.5 
Overall correctly classified   73.3 
 
 
A number of measures support the overall model fit. The Chi square test for change from the base 
model as a result of incorporating the independent variables was statistically significant at 0.002, 
with a recorded reduction in -2LL of 110.01. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test result of 7.606 (p= 
0.473), is a non-significant value suggesting the model is acceptable (Hair et.al ,2006, p.372). 
The R squared results of 0.253 (Cox and Snell) and 0.338 (Nagelkerke) suggest that the model is 
significant in explaining the differences between successful and failed companies. The 
classification table (Table 5) shows that the model correctly predicts 79% of failed companies 
and 68% of successful ones, with a weighted average of correctly classified of 73%. 
 
Of the 10 independent variables included in the regression, 3 are significant at the 0.05 level - 
cost and expense reduction, company size reduction and disposal of non-core assets. All three of 
these measures are positively related to the success of restructuring. The positive odds ratio 
[Exp(B)] indicates that each of the 3 measures has a sizeable impact on the likely success of the 
company in achieving profitability in its third year post-bankruptcy. For example, the odds 
associated with cost and expense reduction suggest that a company adopting this strategy is 3.58 
times more likely to achieve success. Interestingly, these three variables appear to share some 
commonality in being associated with a reduction in the operations of the company, apparently 
achieved through either cost reductions or the sale of either core or non-core assets. In contrast, 
the other operational variables concerned largely with the reconfiguring of internal operations 
(change in management, change in production system, change in sale and service system, change 
in organization structure, improvement in accounting systems, change in internal control 
systems) are not significant in producing profitable outcomes in the restructuring companies. A 





Hambrick and Schecter (1983) nominated four types of turnaround strategies: 1. revenue 
generating; 2. product/market refocusing; 3. cost-cutting; and 4. asset reduction. The evidence 




This research reports on the restructuring methods adopted by Thai firms following post-
bankruptcy reorganization. The study used a unique sample of 101 filing companies whose 
reorganization plans have been confirmed by the Thai Central Bankruptcy Court during the 
period 1999-2002, with performance measures through 2005. 
 
For this sample the median post-bankruptcy performance improved over the three year period and 
also moved closer to that predicted by the companies each year. The recovery rate from 
bankruptcy in this study was 53% of the total number of companies and is consistent with the 
findings of Vongvipanond et al. (2002) who reported a 49% recovery rate during the period 
1998-2002.  
 
The study investigated important details of restructuring strategy implemented by insolvent firms. 
Among three categories of restructuring methods, all firms undertook financial restructuring, 
sixty-seven firms (60.4%) restructured their operations and 43 (38.7%) restructured their asset 
management. Cost reduction, disposal of non-core assets and debt write-off were the most widely 
adopted restructure methods.  
 
The data suggests, subject to limitations, the selection of restructuring methods may differ 
between those companies which successfully reform and those which do not. In particular 
successful companies where found most likely to adopt cost and expense reduction, company size 
reduction and disposal of non-core assets as the most significant operational strategy. In contrast, 
other operational strategies concerned largely with the reconfiguring of internal operations and 
systems appear to be ineffective in producing profitable outcomes in restructuring companies. 
 
There are three possible limitations of the present study. First, a number of the strategies 
undertaken could not be included in the logistic regression because they were insufficiently 
represented in the sample. A larger sample may result in their inclusion. Secondly, the study 
observes performance over a three year period and it is conceivable that some strategies may take 
longer to impact on performance. Finally, the results of the present study cannot easily be 
generalized to other countries because of Thailand’s unique bankruptcy requirements.    
 
In conclusion, there is potential for further research in the area of reconstruction strategy. A later 
larger sample may permit a more refined measure of success, for example, into failure, moderate 
success and success. Also, a larger sample would enable a holdout sample and so permit an 
investigation into prediction of reconstruction strategy. An alternative direction proposed by Liou 
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